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Previous research has found a positive and significant planted acreage response to the 
participation in, and increases in the premium subsidization of, the federal crop insurance 
program. However, no research to our knowledge has evaluated what influence the 
response in planted acreage and crop choice to subsidized crop insurance has had on market 
industry in terms of farm numbers and average farm output. To address this issue, we utilize 
the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium with subsidized crop insurance to generate 
a conceptual model with econometrically testable hypotheses. Testing the econometric 
model in two distinct regions of the U.S, we find the premium subsidy regime change in 
the federal crop insurance program associated with the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 
2000 has contributed to fewer farms and larger average farm output across over 600 
counties in two distinct regions in the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Introduction 
Over the past four decades the federal crop insurance program (FCIP) evolved from an 
obscure government provided risk management program to the primary government risk 
management program.  Expansion of FCIP occurred through a series of legislative acts, 
beginning in 1980 with the Federal Crop Insurance Act, followed by the Federal Insurance 
Reform Act in 1994, and the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000, all aimed 
at encouraging producer participation through increased premium subsidies and enhanced 
coverage options. These acts resulted in an increase in premium subsidies from $0.20 
billion in 1989 to $0.80 billion in 1995 to $6.2 billion in 2017.  As a result of increased 
subsidies, program liability also increased from $13.5 billion in 1989 to $23 billion in 1995 
to $106 billion in 2017.  At the crop per acre level, the impacts of the legislative acts are 
even more pronounced.  For corn, average per acre subsidy increased over twelvefold from 
$2.22 per acre in 1989 to $27.20 per acre in 2017 while average liability increased over 
three-fold from $171.75 per acre to $499.00 per acre (RMA 2018).  
Under the United States Department of Agriculture, the Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) administers the program and has a statutory goal of a loss ratio equal to one. This 
means that FCIC premiums are set to equal the expected value of the indemnity.  The 
federal government offers premium subsidies to all insurance participants, which for crops 
like corn, soybeans and wheat, are applied as a percent of premium.  Premium subsidies 
directly lower the cost of insurance participation and indirectly provide a positive expected 
return to insurance participation over time. Hence, legislatively increasing premium 
subsidies raises expected returns to insurance participation.  
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It has long been suggested in the literature that to the extent that a rise in expected 
returns to participation in insurance induces individual participating farmers to expand 
planted acreage and increase crop output, and to the extent that they collectively supply a 
significant share of total output, participating farmers may see their benefit from insurance 
offset by declining market revenue and non-participating farmers make incur losses, all 
because the resulting increase in aggregate crop supply in the face of inelastic market crop 
demand results in declining market prices (Young et al. 2001).   
Other literature has confirmed a significant response of planted acres to both general 
crop insurance participation (Wu 1999), and premium subsidization (Goodwin, Vandeveer, 
and Dean 2004; Goodwin and Smith 2013; Yu, Smith, and Sumner 2017). What these 
articles did not consider is that, by even modestly influencing planted acreage of insured 
crops, federal crop insurance may alter market returns and hence industry structure. 
What this thesis suggests and empirically tests, is that, by affecting market returns for 
participating as well non-participating farmers, subsidized crop insurance may also affect 
farm industry structure in the long-run through entry and exit in response to the interplay 
between market returns and expected returns from subsidized insurance, and the co-
existence of participating and non-participating farmers.  Positive net returns to program 
participation may give a strategic financial advantage to insurance participants over non-
participants. Program participants may outbid financially strapped non-participants in land 
purchase and rental markets.  More importantly, after a rare and adverse event such as a 
drought, which generally triggers indemnity payments, those with insurance can better 
compete in the land rental and purchase market due to a substantially better off financial 
position.  Non-participants in a poor financial position who are losing shares in the land 
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rental and purchase market may exit the industry. These points suggest that the program 
may induce long-run changes in farm structure.   
To empirically estimate such changes, this thesis draws on the theory of long-run 
competitive equilibrium to examine whether subsidized federal crop insurance has induced 
long-run changes in farm structure. Specifically, we formulate and empirically implement 
a conceptual model that incorporates returns of subsidized insurance participation into 
producer profit and guarantees the profit is driven to zero in the long-run. We use the 
comparative statics with respect to the exogenous shift in the crop insurance regime 
brought by ARPA to provide predictions on how changes in the regime influence the 
number of farms and average farm output in the long-run. We test the econometric model 
using two newly constructed county-level panel datasets for two multi-state U.S. regions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Federal crop insurance has been the focus of many academic studies. These studies have 
ranged from asymmetric information in the form of either moral hazard or adverse selection 
(Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; Babcock and Hennessy 1996; Smith and Goodwin 1996; 
Atwood, Robinson-Cox, and Shaik 2006; Walters et al. 2015), to environmental concerns 
(Goodwin and Smith 2003; Schoengold, Ding and Headlee 2014; Walters et al. 2012) to 
land use changes (Wu 1999; Wu and Adams 2001; Young Vandeveer and Schnepf 2001; 
Goodwin, Vandeever, and Deal 2004; Walters et al. 2012; Goodwin and Smith 2013; Yu, 
Smith, and Sumner 2017).   
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 Our work on the long-run structural influence of crop insurance is similar in nature 
with work examining the relationship between crop insurance and land use. Young, 
Vandeveer, and Schnepf (2001) and Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Dean (2004) both found a 
small and positive planted acreage response to crop insurance participation and premium 
subsidization. These results suggest crop insurance influences the producers’ decision-
making process.  Key and Roberts (2006; 2007; 2008) found empirical evidence of a strong 
association between government payments per acre and subsequent market concentration 
growth rates at the zip-code level. Additionally, they found a positive and significant 
association between government payments per acre and farm-level survival rates.  Walters 
et al. (2012) found a small but significant impact on planted acreage increase of insured 
crops. Their study used producer level data and showed the effect of crop insurance 
participation on planted acreage varied by region and crops. Goodwin and Smith (2013) 
present some preliminary empirical evidence that increased premium subsidization 
positively impacted crop acreage. More recently, Yu, Smith, and Sumner (2017) broke 
down the acreage response to increased premium subsidization into direct profit and 
indirect profit effects. Like others, they found a positive acreage response to increasing 
premium subsidies. Yu and Sumner (2018) found that premium subsides’ effects varied, 
with larger impacts on risky crop investments.  
This thesis more closely examined the relationship between crop insurance and 
farm entry and exit. Wang et al. (2003) have concluded, based on empirical evidence, that 
some farmers participate in the insurance program only to receive the premium subsidy. 
Cabas et. al (2008) used an expected utility framework to model the exit and entry decisions 
of farmers through the Ontario crop insurance program between 1988 and 2004. They 
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found when modeling entry and exit decisions at the farm-level separately, aggregation 
often mutes the effect of key variables. Our analysis differs from theirs in two significant 
ways. First, we are directly interested in the aggregate effects of the FCIP in terms of 
number of farms and average farm size. Second, while they model the decision to 
participate in the insurance program, we model the influence of the FCIP on the decision 
to farm. 
Burns and Prager (2018) examined the relationship between United States net 
farmer paid premiums, farm expansion, and farm exit between 2007 and 2012. They found 
no association between higher farmer paid premiums and the decision to expand their 
operation or exit farming. However, they only consider data between 2007 and 2012, a 
short time-frame with few changes to the FCIP. Additionally, they noted future research 
should focus on the effects of premium subsidies rather than paid premiums on farm 
survival. 
The effects of policy on market structure in the long-run has been studied in many 
theoretical and empirical contexts. This literature includes effects of various policies, e.g. 
trade (Dixit 1984; Venables 1985; Eaton and Grossman 1986; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1988; 
Belloc 2006), environmental (Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler 1991; Lahiri and Ono 2007), 
market transparency in the livestock industry (Azzam 2003), and government investment 
(Munnel 1992). The influence of environmental regulation on farm structure has been 
extensively examined in the livestock industry (Metcalfe 2001: Roe, Irwin, and Sharp 
2002: Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier 2005; Weersink and Eveland 2006; Sneeringer 
and Key 2011; Azzam, Nene, and Shoengold 2014).  
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Conceptually, our model most resembles the framework in Azzam, Nene, and 
Shoengold (2014). What Azzam, Nene, and Shoengold (2014) discovered was that the 
effects of environmental size-based policy on hog market industry structure depends on 
how the policy shifts the typical large-scale hog producer’s marginal cost relative to the 
average cost.  Analogously, what we find is that subsidized crop insurance’s influence on 
market structure at least partially depends on the marginal returns to insurance relative to 
average returns. 
3. Review of Federal Crop Insurance 
 
Before analyzing how subsidized crop insurance influences market structure, the basics of 
crop insurance are briefly reviewed. Walters et al. (2012) provides additional details not 
presented here. The typical producer profit in the absence of insurance is given by: 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐(𝑞,𝒘) (1) 
Where p is output price, q is production quantity, 𝑐(𝑞,𝒘) is the cost function, and 𝒘 is a 
vector of factor prices. Purchasing insurance sets a guaranteed lower bound to the profit 
function through the addition of an indemnity function while reducing profit across all 
outcomes by the value of the premium. Total payoff from subsidized crop insurance is 
given by: 
𝑣(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧) =  𝐼(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧)  −  ℎ(𝑧)  +  𝑠(𝑧) (2) 
Where  𝐼(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧)  represents the indemnity (payout), ?̅?, represents the production history, 
z represents the producer insurance contract choice, ℎ(𝑧) represents the actuarially fair total 
premium i.e. cost, for contract choice 𝑧 (e.g. coverage-level, policy type, etc.), and 𝑠(𝑧)  
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represents the total premium subsidy available for contract z . The farmer always pays 
𝑠(𝑧)  −  ℎ(𝑧) in premiums and receives an indemnity payment 𝐼(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧) whenever ?̅? > 𝑞.  
The FCIP experienced a major change in its premium subsidy regime following 
ARPA in 2000. Table 1 gives the change in percent of premiums paid for by the 
government (i.e. subsidy levels) for yield-based policies across coverage levels on basic 
(and optional) units pre and post-ARPA (O’Donoghue 2014).  Figure 1 presents the 
average national premium subsidy per acre for corn, wheat, and soybeans between 1991 
and 2012. It is clear ARPA had an important influence on premium subsidies. Figure 2 
shows the national buy-up premium subsidy per planted acre for corn, wheat, and soybeans. 
Prior to ARPA, revenue policies’ premium subsidies had a stated per acre subsidy level. 
ARPA made revenue-based policies’ premium subsidies identical to yield-based policies 
under which the premium subsidy is applied as a percentage of the premium (Babcock and 
Hart 2005). As a result, revenue-based policies became more attractive to farmers and 
expanded between 1997 and 2002 following its introduction in 1996 and the ARPA 
induced subsidy regime change (figure 3). Although we cannot say the trend toward 
revenue-based insurance products would not have continued without ARPA these points 
suggest ARPA represented a major shift in the FCIP, altering the environment in which 
producers manage risk.  
The hypothesis in this thesis is that by inducing changes in production at the 
producer level, such a large and immediate shift in premium subsidization has affected 
market returns through a shift in supply at the market level, stimulating a change in farm 
structure through entry and exit. To test the hypothesis, we first incorporate the returns to 
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subsidized insurance and the effect of the change in the ARPA regime into producer profits 
such that: 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐(𝑞,𝒘)  +  𝐼(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧∗(𝜃))  −  ℎ(𝑧∗ (𝜃))  +  𝑠(𝑧∗(𝜃), 𝜃)  =  
𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐(𝑞,𝒘) + 𝑣(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧∗(𝜃), 𝜃) (3) 
 
For simplicity and in anticipation of empirical implementation, we assume the 
contract choice 𝑧∗,  to have been chosen in response to 𝜃 prior to the choice output, which 
we assume is based on static profit maximization. Rather than additionally modeling 
optimal coverage selection, which is not our goal, we remain agnostic as to how the level 
of coverage is chosen. While the usual approach is to assume that producers maximize 
expected utility of profits (see Cabas, Leiva, and Weersink 2008). There is empirical 
evidence that such an assumption is not supported by observed farmer behavior (Du, Feng, 
and Hennessy 2017). Additionally, prospect theory was shown to be empirically 
inconsistent with observed coverage choice when insurance is viewed as a risk 
management tool but may be consistent when viewed as a stand-alone investment 
(Babcock 2015).  
The variable  𝜃  represents an exogenous shift in ARPA. The shift variably affects 
profits increasing the premium subsidy regime across coverage levels. Since the optimal 
coverage level 𝑧∗ is a function of 𝜃,  changing the subsidy regime across all 𝑧∗ may induce 
producers to increase their coverage level or switch policies (i.e. increase 𝑧∗). This means 
that a change in the ARPA regime would affect the payoff from insurance directly and 
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indirectly through the contract choice. To demonstrate, we differentiate the payoff 𝑣 with 
respect to the change in the ARPA regime 𝜃: 
𝑑𝑣
𝑑𝜃
=  𝑣 𝜃 +
𝑑𝑧 ∗
𝑑𝜃
 (
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑧 ∗
−
𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑧 ∗
+
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑧 ∗
) (4) 
Where the first term on the right-hand side 𝑣 𝜃 is the direct effect and always positive, i.e. 
the government cannot decrease the returns to insurance by increasing subsidies, ceteris 
paribus. The indirect effect is captured by the second term, where 
𝑑𝑧∗
𝑑𝜃
 is the response of 
optimal contract choice,  
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑧∗
  the change in indemnity payments, assumed positive;  
𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑧∗
 the 
change in total premium; also assumed positive, and 
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑧∗
 the change in the premium subsidy. 
The last term is generally increasing for lower coverage-levels and decreasing for higher 
coverage levels (see Babcock and Hart 2005 for example). Because the premium subsidy 
level at the dollars per acre level is a non-linear function of z*, increasing z* could increase 
or decrease the total returns to insurance depending on the typical producer’s optimal 
contract choice. This implies the sign of bracketed term,  
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑧∗
−
𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑧∗
+
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑧∗
 , is ambiguous. 
4. Conceptual Model 
 
Considering the preceding discussion, the starting point of the conceptual model is a 
perfectly competitive crop industry consisting of n profit-maximizing identical farms, each 
producing output q using technology  𝑐(𝑞,𝒘) with marginal cost increasing in q, i.e., 
𝑚𝑐𝑞 = 𝑐𝑞𝑞  >  0. Inverse market demand is denoted by 𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑛 ∗ 𝑞), where 𝑝 is the 
market price with 𝑝′ < 0, and n is the number of (equally sized) farms. Profits for the 
average  farm are given by: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞[𝑝(𝑛 ∗ 𝑞)𝑞 − 𝑐(𝑞,𝒘) + 𝑣(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧
∗(𝜃), 𝜃)] (5) 
The long-run equilibrium of the farm and the industry are given by the optimality 
conditions 
𝑝(𝑛 ∗ 𝑞) − 𝑚𝑐(𝑞,𝒘) + 𝑣𝑞(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧
∗(𝜃), 𝜃) = 0       (6) 
                                      𝑝(𝑛 ∗ 𝑞) −
𝑐(𝑞,𝒘)
𝑞
+
𝑣(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑧∗(𝜃), 𝜃)
𝑞
= 0 (7) 
where (6) insures static profit be maximized and (7) requires each farm’s profit (including 
returns to insurance) is driven to zero in the long-run.  
The effect of a change in 𝜃  on farm structure is found by totally differentiating (6) 
and (7) with respect to 𝜃 and solving for the change in the average output, 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝜃
 , and the 
change in the number of farms 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝜃
 . The economic intuition behind this system is straight-
forward. Prior to a shift in 𝜃, the market is in long-run equilibrium such that (6) and (7) 
hold. When the government alters the crop insurance subsidy regime, the initial long-run 
equilibrium is disrupted. A new equilibrium, where (6) and (7) hold again, is attained 
through a change in n, the number of farms, and 𝑞, average output.  
In matrix form, this system of equations is represented by  
[
𝑝′𝑛 + 𝜋𝑞𝑞 𝑝
′𝑞
𝑝′𝑛 + 𝐷1  −   𝐷2 𝑝
′𝑞
]
[
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝜃
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝜃]
 
 
 
 
= − [
𝐴
𝑀
] (8) 
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With A=
𝑣𝑧∗
𝑑𝑧∗
𝑑𝜃
 + 𝑣𝜃
𝑞
=
(
𝑑𝑣
𝑑𝜃
)
𝑞
, 𝑀 = 𝑣𝑞𝑧∗
𝑑𝑧∗
𝑑𝜃
 +  𝑣𝑞𝜃,  𝜋𝑞𝑞 = 𝑣𝑞𝑞 − 𝑐𝑞𝑞 < 0, and 𝐷1  −   𝐷2  =
(
𝑎𝑐(𝑞)
𝑞
−
𝑚𝑐(𝑞)
𝑞
) − (
𝑎𝑣(∙)
𝑞
−
𝑣𝑞(∙)
𝑞
)  where 𝑎𝑐(𝑞) and 𝑎𝑣(∙) denote the average production 
cost and average returns to insurance, respectively, and 𝑚𝑐(𝑞) and 𝑣𝑞(∙) denote the 
marginal production cost and marginal returns to insurance. Letting Λ denote the 2 x 2 
matrix in (8), 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝚲)  =  𝑝′𝑛( 𝐷1  −   𝐷2 − 𝜋𝑞𝑞).  
A represents the average marginal returns to insurance due to the shift in 𝜃. Because 
it is directly proportional to  
𝑑𝑣
𝑑𝜃
 , the term A cannot be signed following the discussion on 
(4) above. The term 𝑀 represents the change in the marginal returns to insurance with 
respect to a change in output following the shift in 𝜃. Its sign cannot be determined without 
further assumptions about the relationship between 𝑣𝑞(∙), the marginal returns to insurance 
with respect to output, and 𝜃 or z*.  𝜋𝑞𝑞 is signed according to the second-order sufficient 
condition of (5).   
The term 𝐷1  −   𝐷2 denotes the difference in differences between average/marginal 
cost and average/marginal insurance. While traditional long-run competitive equilibrium 
models’ marginal cost equal average cost, this is not the case here. The reason the 
respective cost functions differ is due to the presence of positive returns to insurance in (3). 
We can also interpret 𝐷1  −   𝐷2  in another way which directly demonstrates how crop 
insurance can influence entry or exit and average farm size. Rearranging the terms shows 
𝐷1  −  𝐷2 = (
𝑎𝑐(𝑞)
𝑞
−
𝑎𝑣(∙)
𝑞
 )  −  (
𝑚𝑐(𝑞)
𝑞
−
𝑣𝑞(∙)
𝑞
). This demonstrates that the sign of 𝐷1  −
  𝐷2 depends on the difference between the insurance-induced decline in average cost and 
marginal cost, respectively. Altering cost structure has been shown to influence market 
12 
 
equilibrium in multiple settings (Perrin 1997; Azzam, Nene, and Schoengold. 2014). 
Without knowing the typical farmer’s average cost relative to average returns to insurance, 
𝐷1  −  𝐷2  cannot be signed (hence 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝚲) remains unsigned). However, this term 
highlights the important effects average returns to insurance has on market structure.  
Solving (8) yields 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝜃
=
𝑴 −  𝑨
(𝑫𝟏  −  𝑫𝟐 − 𝝅𝒒𝒒 ) 
(9) 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝜃
=
𝑨𝝅𝒒𝒒  +  𝑴(𝑫𝟏  −  𝑫𝟐)
𝒑′𝒒(𝑫𝟏  −  𝑫𝟐 − 𝝅𝒒𝒒 )
 − (
𝒏
𝒒
) (
𝒅𝒒
𝒅𝜽
) (10) 
While (9) and (10) have no obvious sign, they do provide information. For example, 
assuming 𝑀 = 0, 𝐷1  =  𝐷2,  and 𝐴 < 0 simplifies the expressions. The restrictions imply 
the marginal returns to insurance with respect to 𝑞 are unchanged by 𝜃 and the change in 
average and marginal cost due to insurance offset one another;  𝐴 < 0  implies the subsidy 
regime change lead the typical farmers to increase coverage high enough that total returns 
to insurance decreased relative to before the subsidy regime change. The decline in market 
returns leads to exit;  
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝜃
= − (
𝐴
𝝅𝒒𝒒
 +
A
p′q
)  <  0, and a rise in average output 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝜃
=
𝐴
( 𝜋𝑞𝑞 ) 
>
 0 , implying and increase in the average size of the farms in the new industry equilibrium.   
Determining other conditions under which (9) and (10) are positive, negative, or 
zero is complex because of the sign ambiguity of multiple parameters, and particularly 
because of the effect of the subsidy regime and the respective shifts in average production 
costs and average returns to insurance relative to the respective shifts in marginal 
production costs and margins returns to insurance. Instead of delineating every other 
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condition under which each equation yields a clear sign in theory, we turn to the empirical 
version of the theoretical model to determine the direction of the crop insurance effect on 
the number and size of farms due to ARPA.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
1. Empirical Model and Estimation Procedure 
 
Based on the above conceptual model, the relevant variables for econometric 
implementation are output (𝑞), number of farms (𝑛), output prices (𝑝), production history 
(?̅?), optimal crop insurance coverage (𝑧∗), the premium subsidy level, ARPA (𝜃), and 
factor prices (𝒘). Solving (6) and (7) for average output and number of firms provides the 
estimating equations  
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡, ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑧 ∗𝑖𝑗𝑡 (𝜃𝑡), 𝜃𝑡) (11) 
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡, ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑧 ∗𝑖𝑗𝑡 (𝜃𝑡), 𝜃𝑡) (12) 
for county i, our unit of aggregation, in region j ∈ {Corn Belt, wheat}, described in the data 
section below, in year t. We augment these functions with a linear time-trend to account 
for the state of crop production technology (𝑇𝑡). Because the premium subsidy per acre 
available to farmers shifted under 𝜃𝑡 it is reasonable to assume the effect of 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  (which 
helps determine the premium subsidy a farm receives) on farm industry structure also 
shifted. Therefore, we interact 𝜃𝑡 with 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗   and assume (11) and (12) take the following 
linear forms: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0𝑗 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼3𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑗(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ )
+ (𝛼5𝑗 + 𝑎5𝑖𝑗)𝜃𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑗(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ ∗ 𝜃𝑡)  
+𝛼7𝑗𝑇𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 (13) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑗(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ )
+ (𝛽5𝑗 + 𝑏5𝑖𝑗)𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑗(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ ∗ 𝜃𝑡) 
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+𝛽7𝑗𝑇𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑛 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘 (14) 
 
Where 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 and 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘 denote random error terms and  𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑘  is USDA state-level crop-reporting 
district fixed-effects to control for unobservable time invariant district effects. While we 
would ideally use county-level fixed effects, our implementation of the model with county 
fixed-effects is not feasible because of the number of parameters involved. Because each 
state has several crop reporting districts which are made up of around ten similar counties 
in each state, little information is lost by estimating the model with district rather than 
county-fixed effects. However, when dropping the random slope and estimating both 
models with county-fixed effects, we obtain nearly identical marginal results for all 
models. 
 Our data (described below) are hierarchical at the county, crop reporting district, 
state, and regional levels.  To account for the hierarchal structure both (13) and (14) are 
estimated using a random effects model, allowing for a random slope on ARPA (𝜃𝑡) at the 
county level. This variable captures the exogenous shift in the premium subsidy regime 
brought about by ARPA. For econometric implementation, 𝜃𝑡 is measured by a dummy 
variable whose value is 0 in all counties for years prior to 2001 and 1 for all years after. 
Given the results of (9) and (10) and that returns to insurance likely differ across counties, 
we hypothesize ARPA’s effect will also vary by county and therefore use a random-slope 
model to form a county-level distribution of effects which we can map across space. 
This specification gives an ARPA specific effect by county, providing information 
on the distributional effect of ARPA across space.  While 𝛼5𝑗 and 𝛽5𝑗 are assumed fixed 
means in the population, we treat 𝑎5𝑖𝑗 and 𝑏5𝑖𝑗 as normally distributed random variables. 
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That is to say that in (13) and (14) we allow for random slopes (effects) of ARPA at the 
county-level with the assumptions that both slope parameters are normally distributed. We 
assume the variance-covariance matrix of the random effects has no predetermined 
structure in order to avoid imposing additional restrictions on the data (Laired and Ware 
1982).  We estimate the linear mixed models in STATA using MIXED command with an 
unstructured variance-covariance random effects matrix. 
We also address important econometric issues.  First, our time series showed 
evidence of heteroscedasticity.  We estimated robust cluster standard errors to account for 
this sampling error structure.  Second, endogeneity may exist in our model because either 
input or output prices and either of the dependent variables may be jointly determined.  We 
tested for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.  We found evidence of 
endogeneity in the Corn Belt for both output price indices and input prices under both 
dependent variable specifications using a 5% critical level. In the wheat region, we found 
evidence of endogeneity in output price indices in the average output specification and in 
input prices in the grain farm specification using a 5% critical level.  
To address the endogeneity issues, we need strong instruments.  For input prices 
we relied upon national childhood obesity rates between 1992 and 2012 (Fryar, Carroll, 
and Ogden 2016). While obesity may not immediately appear a good instrument, 
Courtemanche (2011) found robust evidence of a link between gasoline prices (a major 
agricultural input) and obesity. As gas prices rise, people walk more which also 
accompanies fewer restaurant visits as individuals budget more. This creates a link between 
oil prices and obesity.  We found evidence of obesity being a strong instrument using the 
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic in conjunction with the Stock and Yogo weak instrument test 
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with a maximal instrumental variable critical value of 1% in both regions (minimum 
eigenvalue F Stats of 418 and 89 in corn and wheat regions respectively).   
For the output price index, we use the 5-year moving average annual returns from 
the S and P 500 index. We cannot use lagged output values because the index is chained, 
and correlation with the error term will carry over through time (Reed 2015). Tedesse et 
al. (2014) have presented evidence of a strong link between increased financial speculation 
and food price volatility via the commodity futures market using data from the Chicago 
Board of Trade and USDA. Given the connection between the total market and commodity 
futures market through ETFs and other derivatives, the S and P 500 returns represents a 
valid instrument for commodity price indexes. Testing for strength, we found evidence of 
strong instruments using the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic in conjunction with the Stock 
and Yogo weak instrument test with a critical value below 1% in both regions (minimum 
eigenvalue F statistics of 5172 and 910 in corn and wheat regions respectively).  
 
2. Data 
As discussed above, we construct the data using counties as units of observation. The 
counties considered are from the top-five corn and soybeans producing states: Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota and Nebraska and the top-five wheat producing states: Kansas, 
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Washington. These states generally accounted for 
the largest share of production (in terms of bushels) in corn/soybean and wheat production 
between 1992 and 2012 (NASS 2018). The ten states encapsulate a significant share of 
national grain markets, variation in climate, soil, production methods and crop-type.  
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The number of farms is obtained from the quinquennial USDA Census of 
Agriculture for years 1992, 1997, 2001, 2007, and 2012. Because some counties have a 
significant number of non-grain farms (e.g. livestock operations), rather than using the total 
farms estimate, we use a subset that focuses on the number of farms, as classified under 
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) available from the Census of 
Agriculture. Within the Census of Agriculture, the number of ‘Oilseed and Grain’ farms 
are reported for each county in each year. According to the 2017 NAICS Manual, “This 
industry group comprises establishments primarily engaged in (1) growing oilseed and /or 
grain crops and/or (2) producing oilseed and grain seeds” (NAICS 2017). Hence, the 
dataset covers farms primarily involved in the production of corn, soybeans, and wheat.  
Crop production must be aggregated across multiple crop types to measure county-
level output and prices to obtain a single output estimate for each county in each year. For 
each state, we first determined which crops accounted for the majority of crop insurance 
liability across all counties in the state across all years in the sample. Data on crop liability 
were obtained from the Summary of Business county-level data available from the RMA 
for years between 1992 and 2012 (RMA 2018). We select a combination of crops for each 
state that covered, on average, at least 75% of county-level insurance liability. Table 2 
provides a meta-data summary of the crop types included for counties in each state. 
Additionally, the average percent of liability covered by the selected crops is provided. For 
wheat producing states, we focus on counties where wheat accounted for at least 50% of 
liability, on average, across all years. Table 2 also includes the number of counties in the 
dataset for each state. 
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For the county-level aggregation of prices and quantities across crops, we rely on 
the Tornqvist approximation to the Divisa Index (referred to as the Tornqvist Index) setting 
1992 as the base year (Tornqvist 1936). Tornqvist Indices are chained and flexible, 
meaning the output index provides a second-order approximation to any arbitrary 
homogenous production function. Also, the index is exact for translog production 
functions.  Additionally, it has been concluded the index “… can probably be used in 
analyzing most production situations” (Christensen 1974). In studying the effect of index 
choice on Canadian agricultural output and input indices, Fantino and Veeman (1997) find 
little difference between the Fischer Ideal Index and the Tornqvist Index. Essentially, one 
creates revenue shares of each commodity in the index and multiples each yearly share 
distribution by the individual commodities’ quantity (or price) to get the relative change 
from one year to the next. Once a base year is set, a chained index for each year can be 
calculated based on the previous year and the percent change from one year to the next. 
Appendix A provides detailed formulation of the county-level price and quantity indices.  
Once total county output (Q = n * q) is aggregated using the Tornqvist Index, we calculate 
average output (q) by dividing total output by the number of grain and oilseed farms (q = 
𝑄
𝑛
=
𝑛∗𝑞
𝑛
).  
To aggregate z*, the optimal producer contract choice, the total buy-up insured 
acres at the county-level of each respective crop is calculated from county-level data 
available from the RMA Summary of Business (RMA 2018). That is, for empirical 
implementation we take optimal contract choice as whether a given planted acre is insured 
with a buy-up policy or not and hence aggregate across coverage-level, policy, and unit 
types. We leave out Catastrophic coverage (CAT), which generally covers 50% of average 
20 
 
production history at 55% of the projected price. Hence CAT policies represent minimal 
coverage at best and generally do not pay indemnities. Therefore, we do not expect CAT 
policies to drive changes in market structure compared to buy-up policies. While we would 
ideally separate the variable by coverage-level to allow varying effects, we are unable to 
do so because of high multicollinearity between contract choice levels. 
 The buy-up coverage insured acres of each commodity included in the county are 
then summed across the commodities to measure total county-level insured acres. To keep 
the panel balanced, counties with no insurance policies available in 1992 were excluded 
from the analysis. 
Total insured acres are then divided by the sum of estimated total planted acres 
across commodities. These data are available from the USDA’s National Agricultural 
Statistical Services (NASS 2018). NASS does not estimate planted acre for all crops in all 
counties for all years. For county-crop-year combinations that are missing, the county 
average (of all available years between 1992 and 2012) estimate of planted acres is used, 
provided there is at least one year of estimated planted acres. If no estimate in any year for 
a specific county-crop combination is available, that crop is dropped from the analysis 
within that county. The variable z* is then an estimate of the proportion of planted acres 
covered under a buy-up coverage policy at the county-level. Letting  𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 denote buy-up 
insured acreage and 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡  denote the NASS acreage estimate in county i for commodity k 
in year t, 𝑧 ∗𝑖𝑡=
∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑘
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑘
. 
To calculate production history (?̅?), we obtain NASS county-level estimated yields 
for years between 1982 and 2012. Following how the RMA calculates average production 
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history (APH) for individual producers, we use a ten-year moving average for each county-
crop combination. We then weight each moving average crop yield by the long-run 
proportion of estimated planted acres accounted for by each commodity described below. 
All available county-level crop yields across time are used to calculate an average if 
specific county-crop-year combinations are missing. Crops are dropped from the county 
analysis if no yield estimate is available in that county for any year. Because NASS either 
estimates both acres and yields or does not estimate either, the same crops are dropped 
from the same counties as with the calculation of z*. Each crop’s ten year moving-average 
yield estimate is then weighted by the long-run proportion of estimated planted acres 
accounted for by that crop. The weighted yields are then summed to form an estimate of ?̅?. 
Letting 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 denote the NASS yield estimate, in county i for commodity k in year t, the ten-
year moving-average is 
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡0−9
𝑡=𝑡0
10
. If  𝜇𝑖𝑘 represents the estimated long-run proportion of 
planted acres accounted for by commodity k, then ∑
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡0−9
𝑡=𝑡0
10𝑘
∙ 𝜇𝑖𝑘 = ?̅?𝑖𝑡 
For input prices, w, we would ideally use a county-level input price index. 
However, such an index is not readily available. Therefore, we use inflation adjusted state-
level gasoline prices (in $/ btu) available from the Energy Information Administration (EIA 
2018). While this does not allow us to fully capture variability of all input prices across 
time and space, it does allow us to capture variability of a major input used in the 
production process.  As discussed in the empirical modeling section, we instrument input 
prices with yearly childhood obesity rates available from the CDC (2012). 
Summary statistics for both regions can be found in table 3. The tables in Appendix 
C give the same summary statistics by state. 
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3. Results 
We first present and discuss parameter estimates from equations (13) and (14) for the Corn 
Belt region followed by a discussion of the wheat region results and conclude with a 
general comparison of results between the two regions.   
Corn Belt 
Focusing on the number of farms as the dependent variable in table 4 we find that 
all independent variables are significant at the 10% or below except for the output price 
index, the ARPA and contract choice interaction term, and the time trend.  The estimated 
coefficient on the input price index is negative and significant, indicating higher input 
prices are associated with fewer farm numbers. The estimated coefficient implies 
production history is positively associated with the number of farms.   
Because of the presence of the interaction term we calculated the marginal effects 
of ARPA and contract choice on Corn Belt farm numbers, found at the bottom of table 4. 
These estimates are of interest because significant effects of ARPA provide evidence of a 
structural break in the farm industry that occurred simultaneously with ARPA.  Results 
indicate statistically negative ceterus paribus impact of ARPA on the farm numbers; the 
estimated effect is a 36% decrease in farm numbers for the average county. While this 
number may seem large in magnitude, it is important to note that many counties in the data 
set had relatively few farms for the first two years in the data set.  In the Corn Belt, nearly 
10% of counties had fewer than 100 farms in 1997. This can translate into a rather large 
percentage change in farm numbers even if the absolute change between 1992-1997 and 
2002-2012 is relatively small.  
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Table 4 also presents the marginal effects of the county-level contract choice. The 
estimate is 0.13 and significant below only the 5% level. The marginal results of the 
contract choice can be interpreted as follows: if a county increased its percentage of planted 
acres covered by a crop insurance policy ten percentage points (z* increases by 0.1), there 
is an approximately (0.10 * 0.13)*100% = 1.3% marginal effect on farm numbers from the 
increase in contract choice because the regressions are log-linear with respect to z*. This 
increase is modest compared to larger (in magnitude) marginal effect associated with 
ARPA (recall the estimated marginal effect is an approximately 36% decrease). The 
positive sign is consistent with the hypothesis that subsidized insurance is negatively 
influencing farm numbers if we assume the increase in covered acres corresponds to more 
farms participating in the insurance program (and hence less likely to face ruin given 
adverse outcomes). However, given the small magnitude of the estimate, the results 
indicate the effects of insurance on farm numbers in the Corn Belt has largely been a result 
of the structural break that occurred with ARPA rather than increases in buy-up coverage.  
Through the random effect we can inspect the distributional impact of ARPA across 
all 426 Corn Belt counties.  Figure 4 shows the distribution of ARPA’s estimated effect on 
county-level average farm output in the Corn Belt, calculated by adding the mean estimated 
effect of ARPA to the random slope term for each county then added to the product of the 
mean county-level contract choice and the interaction term (take the partial derivative of 
(13) or (14) with respect to 𝜃𝑡, and replace 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  with its county-level mean) . Results from 
the random effects indicate that all counties except seven experienced a decrease in farm 
numbers. This indicates ARPA was associated with a decrease in numbers in nearly but 
not all counties of the dataset, which is fully consistent with the sign ambiguity of (10). 
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Recall that we hypothesized based on (9) and (10) that ARPA’s influence depends on, 
among other factors, the returns to insurance at the county-level. Hence, we should expect 
a wide distribution of estimates given the geographic variation of the counties and thus 
returns to insurance. Figure 4 demonstrates ARPA was indeed associated with a wide 
distributional effect from an estimated 64% decrease in county-level farm numbers to an 
increase of just over 8%. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the spatial distribution of the histogram found in figure 4. 
We highlight a few notable points. Eastern Nebraska, central Iowa, and central Illinois 
counties have experienced the smallest percentage decrease in farm numbers associated 
with ARPA. As we move geographically farther from these areas, counties tend to 
experience larger changes in farm numbers. We do see clusters of counties that experienced 
the highest percentage decrease (greater than a 40% decrease, brick red in figure 5). Again, 
it is important to remember that the map generates percentage changes in farm numbers at 
the county level. Therefore, each county has its own base number of farms from which the 
percentage change is calculated, so comparisons between counties is limited because the 
estimated changes are not absolute. 
Focusing now on the average farm output as the dependent variable in table 4, all 
parameter estimates except the production history and contract choice are significant at or 
below the 1% level. Both input and the output price index are found to positively influence 
average farm size with input prices having a stronger impact on average farm output than 
the output price index.  An exact interpretation of the estimated parameters on input and 
the output price index is difficult because q, average farm output, is an index divided by 
farm numbers. We do find an increase in the county level production history is associated 
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with an increase in average farm output, but the point estimate is insignificant. The positive 
and significant interaction term implies counties with a higher proportion of planted acres 
in 1992 and 1997 (higher levels of z*) experienced, on average, a greater change in post-
ARPA average farm output. 
  We now turn to the bottom of table 4 to inspect the marginal impact of ARPA and 
contract choice on average farm output.  We found a significant and positive impact of 
ARPA on average farm output by an approximately 47%. It is important to recall the 
average farm output index is chained and then divided by county-level farm numbers. 
Therefore, high levels of growth within the index may not translate to high levels of 
absolute growth of crop production because every county begins with a total production 
index of 100 in 1992. In essence, all we can conclude is ARPA was associated, on average, 
with average farm output growth based on our measurement. We do find a statistically 
significant and positive impact on the marginal impact of contract choice on average farm 
output, with an estimated parameter estimate of 17%. This implies if a county increased its 
percentage of planted acres insured by ten percentage points, there is an approximately 
(0.17 * 0.10) * 100% = 1.7% marginal effect on farm numbers from the increase in contract 
choice. Compared to the 47% marginal effect of ARPA, the relative estimated impact of 
contract choice on average farm output is negligible.  
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the random effects slope like figure 4, except 
now for the marginal effect of ARPA on average farm output. Again, we see a wide 
distributional effect, but with no county estimate falling below zero, indicating ARPA was 
associated with expanded average farm output in all counties in our dataset. Estimates 
range from a 15% increase to a 91% increase.  These results are consistent with previous 
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findings that have found increases in land use in response to crop insurance participation 
(e.g. Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf 2001; Walters et. al 2012; Yu, Smith, and Sumner 
2017). Relating this fact back to (9), it appears the sign is identical for every county in the 
dataset and is positive. Without further knowledge about average farm cost structure, the 
role of insurance in altering production costs, the shape of the marginal insurance payoff 
function, and how ARPA influenced the overall payoff from insurance to the typical 
farmer, we cannot determine which elements of (9) contribute to its unambiguous sign.  
Figure 7 maps the county-level estimated effect of ARPA across space. Again, we 
highlight a few key points with the caveat that comparisons between counties is difficult 
given each county-level index is formed with a unique set of crops and divided by the 
county-level number of farms. Therefore, changes in both the absolute number of farms 
and the output index (chained through time) are used to calculate average farm output. 
Figure 7 shows counties in mainly Iowa and southwestern Minnesota experienced the 
smallest percentage change in average farm output. Nebraska, eastern Illinois, and almost 
all counties in Indiana experienced a greater than 55% increase in average farm output 
associated with ARPA. We again see clustering of colors, potentially due to the fact that 
most counties in a given area grow similar crops and generally have similar farm numbers. 
This makes comparisons between these counties easier and likely influences the patterns 
we see in figure 7. 
Wheat Region 
Table 5 presents the wheat region regression parameter estimates. When number of 
farms is the dependent variable, all variables except for the interaction term, price index, 
and contract choice are significant below the 5% level. Parameter estimates imply higher 
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input prices are associated with fewer farms and a higher output price index (though 
insignificant) are associated with more farms. Input prices are associated with an elastic 
negative effect on farm numbers. The bottom of table 5 presents marginal effects of ARPA 
and contract choice for the wheat region. We again find a significant and positive estimated 
marginal impact of ARPA on farm numbers (56% decrease) while average contract choice 
was associated with an increase in number of farms (and approximately 2.4% increase for 
a ten-percentage point increase in z*).  As with the Corn Belt, we should not be too 
concerned about the large estimated average decrease. Over a quarter of counties in the 
wheat dataset had fewer than 200 farms in 1997. Hence, relatively small changes in 
absolute farm numbers can translate into large estimated percentage changes.  
Figure 8 presents the estimated marginal influence of ARPA on county-level 
number of farms in the wheat region. All estimates are negative, implying ARPA was 
associated with an estimated decrease in county-level farm numbers for all counties in the 
Wheat region.  The estimated effects vary substantially, ranging from a nearly 40% 
decrease to an 80% decrease. Figure 9 plots the estimated distribution in figure 8 to the 
corresponding county across space. We again see some patterns of clustering. The largest 
percentage change category of farm numbers appears in all states (over a 60% decrease, 
brick red, figure 9). 
 With average farm output as the dependent variable in the wheat region, table 5 
shows all independent variables excluding the interaction term are significant below the 
10% level. The output price index is associated with higher average farm output. Input 
prices were found to be positively associated with average farm output. Results indicate 
higher levels of production history are associated with lower levels of average farm output. 
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The bottom of table 5 presents the marginal effect of ARPA on average farm output. 
Results indicate on average ARPA was associated with a 40% increase in average farm 
output.  
Figure 10 presents a histogram of the estimated slope parameters for the average 
farm regression in the wheat region. The estimated effects vary substantially across 
counties with no county experiencing an estimated negative effect, implying ARPA was 
associated with an increase in average farm output 
Figure 11 plots the histogram in figure 10 across space. Again, we note that 
comparisons between counties, particularly those in different areas of the county are not 
useful. Rather, we again note the color clustering is consisted with counties in a small 
geographic area tending to have similar beginning farm industry structure. This 
relationship between nearby counties may contribute to the clustering. However, the 
variation across space with clustering is consistent with variation expected from (9) and 
(10) if counties in a given region grow similar crops, have similar farm numbers, and 
experience, on average, similar returns to insurance.  
Comparisons between Corn Belt and Wheat Region 
We focus now on comparing the results found in table 4 and table 5 between the 
two regions. Considering the number of farms regressions first, we note most independent 
variable parameter estimates are of similar size and significance. While the interaction term 
in the number of farms regression is significant in the wheat region, it is not in the Corn 
Belt. This implies the effect of ARPA in the wheat region was significantly more effected 
by insured planted acres than in the Corn Belt, potentially due to differences in average 
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insurance payouts between the regions. Indeed, comparing the marginal effects at the 
bottom of table 4 and table 5, the marginal effect of ARPA was, in magnitude, greater in 
the wheat region than in the Corn Belt. 
 We see both histograms in figures 4 and 8 are skewed left. The wheat distribution 
is shifted farther to the left than the Corn Belt distribution, demonstrating the larger 
marginal effect found in the wheat region. The other main difference between the two 
regions is the estimated marginal effect of the contract choice, found at the bottom of tables 
4 and 5. While estimates are positive in both regions, the effect of increased insured acres 
in the wheat region is almost twice as large as in the Corn Belt (0.13 compared to 0.24). 
We again note that comparisons beyond these basic highlights is difficult because the 
number of farms per county varies substantially both within a region and between regions.  
 We finally turn to the average farm output regressions, with the caveat that 
comparisons can only be made at the surface given the substantial variation in crop types 
and farm numbers (and hence average output) across the two regions. Again, most 
coefficient estimates are of similar size and magnitude in the average output regressions of 
tables 4 and 5. For the estimated marginal effect of ARPA, the coefficients are both positive 
and significant, with the Corn Belt region experiences a somewhat larger marginal effect 
from ARPA (0.47 and 0.40 respectively), although it is not clear how this translates to 
comparisons in absolute changes. The histograms in figures 6 and 10 indicate the estimated 
county-level distribution of the ARPA random slope variable are similarly dispersed in the 
wheat region and Corn Belt.  
One key difference between the two regressions is the estimated marginal effect of 
the contract choice is positive and significant in the Corn Belt but negative and significant 
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in the wheat region, with the magnitude of the wheat region estimated greater than that of 
the Corn Belt (0.17 and -0.23 respectively). However, when one remembers the different 
crop types of the proportion of liability accounted for in the wheat states versus the Corn 
Belt states (table 2), it is not necessarily surprising these estimates differ. Additionally, the 
wheat regions had around half the counties (units of observations) as the Corn Belt, and 
both estimates are only marginally significant. Overall, we find ARPA, at the margin, was 
associated with an increase in average farm output in both regions, but the effect at the 
county level varied substantially across counties and regions.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Government policy often has unintended consequences, and federal crop insurance may be 
no different. In this thesis, we draw on the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium to 
evaluate the association between ARPA and the industry structure of grain farms. The  
main goal of the thesis was to empirically measure what association, if any, there was 
between ARPA and subsidized crop insurance in general and county-level farm industry 
structure in terms of number of farms and average farm output.  
 Our empirical model, guided by our theoretical model, implies that the 
implementation of ARPA was associated with fewer farms and greater average farm output 
in the top corn, soybean, and wheat producing states. For policy-makers concerned with  
market consolidation and the survival of the family-farm, our results point to a strong 
relationship between crop insurance subsidization and subsequent farm concentration. 
While the results do not apply to any single farm, they do suggest we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the typical farmer has been impacted by the large subsidies available 
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through federal crop insurance. We recognize that the relationship may not be causal, as a 
different measure of subsidization or an economic experiment would need to be established 
to provide any direct link. However, we are unaware of any major structural changes 
outside of ARPA that occurred between 1997 and 2002 that would drive these results even 
after controlling for the general trend in farm numbers and average farm output. 
 These results are useful, but more work is needed to further examine the role of 
subsidized crop insurance on industry concentration and expansion. We aggregate our 
measure of crop insurance participation according to whether a planted acre in a county is 
insured under buy-up coverage. However, theoretically establishing and empirically testing 
varying effects of different coverage-levels on subsequent farm consolidation may be of 
interest. Also, while we do not model the selection of contract type in this paper, future 
work may look to do so. 
 Our results do not generalize to other areas of the country with other crop mixes, 
so expanding the data to include states would be a fruitful follow-up, Still, our work covers 
the largest producing states of the three most valuable (in total dollar terms) crops grown 
in the United States, uncovering a relationship between subsidized insurance and farm 
structure in the crop sector, a relationship that has so far received little attention from 
academics or policy-makers.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Subsidy level (% of premium paid by government) by coverage level for yield-
based policies on basic units at 100% price coverage, pre and post-ARPA 
 
Coverage Level 
 
 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 
Pre- 
ARPA 
55 46 38 42 32 24 17 13 
 
Post-
ARPA 
67 64 64 59 59 56 48 38 
  
Percent 
Increase 
22 39 68 40 84 133 182 192 
Source: O’Donoghue (2014) 
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Figure 1 Average national premium subsidy level by commodity (1991-2012) 
Source: RMA (2018) 
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Figure 2 Average national subsidy per planted acre by commodity (1991-2012) 
Source: RMA (2018) 
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Figure 3 National average % of liability accounted for by revenue and yield based 
insurance products including corn, wheat, and soybean insurance contracts (1992 – 
2012) 
Source: RMA (2018) 
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Table 2. State level summary of crops included, number of counties per state per year, 
and average percent of county level liability accounted for by included crops (standard 
deviation in parenthesis) 
 
 
State  Region Crops Included 
in Analysis 
# of Counties 
Included in 
Balanced Panel 
Average % of 
County-Level 
Liability 
Accounted for 
by Included 
Crops 1992-
2012 
Illinois 
    
Corn Belt Corn, 
Soybeans, 
Wheat (Winter) 
94 97.9% 
(3.4) 
Indiana  Corn Belt Corn, 
Soybeans, 
Wheat (Winter) 
79 95.3% 
(9.6) 
Iowa  Corn Belt Corn, Soybeans 98 98.3% 
(3.5) 
Minnesota 
    
Corn Belt Corn, 
Soybeans, 
Wheat (Spring) 
74 87.3% 
(16.9) 
Nebraska  
    
Corn Belt Corn, 
Soybeans, 
Wheat (Winter) 
81 91.0% 
(13.9) 
Kansas 
    
Wheat Wheat 
(Winter), Corn, 
Soybeans, 
Sorghum 
104 99.1% 
(2.0) 
Montana 
    
Wheat Wheat (Durum, 
Spring, 
Winter), Barley 
34 74.0% 
(25.2) 
North Dakota 
    
Wheat Wheat (Durum, 
Spring, 
Winter), 
Barley, Corn 
Soybeans 
31 75.0% 
(15.0) 
Oklahoma  Wheat Wheat 
(Winter), Corn, 
Cotton, 
Sorghum, 
Soybeans 
41 90.3% 
(18.8) 
Washington 
    
Wheat Wheat (Spring, 
Winter), Barley 
11 75.8 % 
(29.3) 
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Source: RMA (2018) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Regional summary statistics of variables (average output, number of grain 
farms, output price index, contract choice, input prices, and production history) 
Corn Belt Region (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska) 
 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 
2012 
   All Years 
 Avg. S.d Min. Max.  Avg. S.d Min. Max.  Avg. S.d Min. Max. 
q 0.3 0.7 0.1 12.5  0.5 1.2 0.1 19.1  0.5 1.6 0.1 19.1 
              
n 530 266 8.0 154  361 182 6.0 119  428 243 6.0 154 
              
P 107 8.0 100 122  202 80 99 331  164 77 99 331 
              
z 39 21 2.0 92.2  75 17 11 100  60 25 2.3 100 
               
w 9.3 0.6 8.3 10.5  21 7.8 10 30  16 8.1 8.3 30 
              
?̅? 80 17 30 143  99 22 29 162  92 22 30 162 
              
Wheat Region (Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 
2012 
   All Years 
 Avg S.d Min. Max.  Avg S.d Min. Max.  Avg S.d Min. Max. 
q 0.6 3.6 0.1 73  1.46 2.0 0.11 21.1  1.14 2.7 0.1 73.6 
              
n 345 15 2.0 1011  181 125 4.0 705  246 173 2.0 1011 
              
P 104 6.3 89 129  153 65 100 309  152 64 89 309 
              
z 44 22 0.8 99  73 18 9.6 99  61 24 0.8 99 
               
w 9.1 0.7 8.3 10.9  20 7.6 9.9 31.4  16 8.2 8.3 31.4 
              
?̅? 39 13 18 105  46 16 22 109  43 15 18 109 
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Source: RMA (2018), NASS (2018) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Corn Belt region regression parameter estimates and marginal effects estimates 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables: 
Dependent Variables: 
Number of farms 
 
Average farm output 
   
Constant 9.47*** 
(1.32) 
-17.24*** 
(1.84) 
Output Price 
Index 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.40*** 
(0.03) 
Input Price -1.63 *** 
(0.54) 
6.22*** 
(0.75) 
Production 
History 
0.12** 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Contract Choice 0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
ARPA -0.40*** 
(0.04) 
0.33*** 
(0.05) 
ARPA/Contract 
interaction 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
Time Trend 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
 
 
Estimated marginal effects of ARPA and contract choice 
   
ARPA -0.36*** 
(0.01) 
0.47*** 
(0.02) 
Contract  
Choice 
 
 
0.13** 
 (0.06) 
 
 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
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Notes: Prices are in 1992 dollars. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
given in parenthesis below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and 
*** for the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively, with p-values obtained using Wald 
(Standard Normal) Test. 
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Figure 4 Distributions of Corn Belt county-level estimated random slope coefficients, 
number of farms regression  
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Figure 5 Corn Belt spatial distributions of county-level estimated effect of ARPA on 
number of farms 
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Figure 6 Distributions of Corn Belt county-level estimated random slope coefficients, 
average farm output regression  
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Corn Belt spatial distributions of county-level estimated effect of ARPA on 
average farm output 
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Table 5. Wheat region regression parameter estimates and marginal effects estimates 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables: 
Dependent Variables: 
Number of farms 
 
Average farm output 
   
Constant 9.40*** 
(2.00) 
-6.42*** 
(3.43) 
Output Price 
Index 
0.06 
(1.05) 
0.63*** 
(0.06) 
Input Price -2.56** 
(1.27) 
1.93** 
(0.59) 
Production 
History 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
-0.27** 
(0.15) 
Contract Choice 0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.20* 
(0.13) 
ARPA -0.64*** 
(0.07) 
0.43*** 
(0.10) 
ARPA/Contract 
interaction 
0.11*** 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
Time Trend 
 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Estimated marginal effects of ARPA and contract choice 
   
ARPA -0.56*** 
(0.03) 
0.40*** 
(0.05) 
Contract  
Choice 
 
 
0.24** 
 (0.11) 
 
 
-0.23* 
(0.14) 
 
Notes: Prices are in 1992 dollars. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
given in parenthesis below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted by  ***  for 
the 0.01 level, with p-values obtained using Wald (Standard Normal) Test. 
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Figure 8 Distributions of wheat region county-level estimated random slope coefficients, 
number of farms regression  
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Figure 9 Wheat region spatial distributions of county-level estimated effect of ARPA on 
number of farms 
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Figure 10 Distributions of wheat region county-level estimated random slope 
coefficients, average farm output regression 
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Figure 11 Wheat region spatial distributions of county-level estimated effect of ARPA on 
average farm output 
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Appendix I: Formation of Tornvist Price and Quantity Indices 
 
Creating the county-level indices for both prices and quantities follow the same procedure. 
First suppose we have I counties, each with J crops, across T years. Focusing on prices for 
now, for each county I, the relative rate of change of the index is a weighted average of the 
J commodities’ prices (weighted by the share of crop revenue accounted for by each j in 
county i) in the current and previous year.  
Let Pti denote the price index in county i and pit denote the actual received price for 
commodity j in year t. The relative rate of change in logarithmic form is therefore given by 
𝑙𝑛(
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
) =
1
2
∑(
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
+
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐽
𝑗=1
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) = 𝜌𝑖,𝑡 (1𝑎) 
Solving for 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 in terms of 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1, we have  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜌𝑖,𝑡)𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 (2𝑎) 
By arbitrarily setting a base year (1992 in this thesis) to an arbitrary number (100 
in this thesis), the relative price index in each county can be chained together using (2a).  
Similarly, letting 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 denote the Tornqvist quantity index in county i in year t, we 
have 
𝑙𝑛(
𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
) =
1
2
∑(
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
+
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐽
𝑗=1
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) = 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 (3𝑎) 
As above, solving for 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 in terms of 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1, we have  
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜑𝑖,𝑡)𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 (4𝑎) 
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As with prices, we set 1992 as the base year to 100 in each county and chain the future 
quantity index based on (4a).  
For this analysis, the 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡’s are obtained from NASS production estimates (in 
bushels) for all county, crop, year combinations. As discussed in the data section, not all 
counties had all crop production estimated in each year. We use all available data at the 
county-level to calculate an average if specific county-crop-year combinations production 
estimates are missing. Crops are dropped if no bushel estimate is available in any year. 
Because NASS either provides an estimate for acreage, yield, and production or does not 
provide an estimate for any, the same commodities that are dropped for the calculation of 
z and ?̅?.  
The 𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡’s are obtained from NASS state-wide average price received for 
commodity j in year t. Hence, every county in a given state is assumed to have received 
the state-wide average price. While we cannot capture price variations within a state, this 
measure does allow us to capture geographical variations across states and variations in 
prices over time. 
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Appendix II: State-Level Summary Statistics 
 
State Summary Statistics for average output, number of grain farms, output price index, 
contract choice, input price, and production history 
Kansas (104 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Me
an 
S.d Min
. 
Max.  Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max. 
q 0.41 0.29 0.10 1.90  1.19 1.34 0.19 9.30  0.88 1.13 0.10 9.30 
              
n 377.
10 
170.
82 
54.0
0 
1011
.00 
 212.
88 
115.
44 
9.00 705.
00 
 278.
57 
161.
58 
9.00 1011
.00 
              
P 104.
96 
5.72 100.
00 
117.
45 
 196.
70 
70.9
3 
107.
17 
309.
29 
 160.
00 
71.0
7 
100.
00 
309.
27 
              
z 42.0
4 
19.1
2 
5.96 87.9
4 
 76.2
5 
12.9
6 
40.0
6 
98.9
4 
 62.5
7 
22.9
4 
5.96 98.9
4 
               
w 8.92 0.43 8.49 9.34  20.5
3 
7.42 10.7
2 
28.6
0 
 15.8
9 
8.09 8.49 28.6
0 
              
?̅? 48.2
7 
13.2
7 
30.9
3 
105.
06 
 56.6
8 
15.5
0 
32.4
8 
109.
74 
 53.3
1 
15.2
1 
30.9
3 
109.
74 
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Montana (34 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
q 0.75 2.52 0.18 3.84  2.92 3.6
6 
0.11 21.1
3 
 2.06 3.05 0.11 21.1
6 
              
n 200.
74 
120.
87 
26.0
0 
479.
00 
 90.9
7 
87.
03 
4.00 386.
00 
 134.
87 
115.
01 
4.00 479.
00 
              
P 103.
27 
4.55 100.
00 
126.
01 
 188.
40 
54.
26 
111.
77 
262.
90 
 154.
35 
59.3
1 
100.
00 
262.
90 
              
z 56.1
3 
22.4
2 
7.95 99.4
9 
 71.5
7 
21.
47 
17.2
0 
99.5
4 
 65.4
0 
23.0
7 
7.95 99.5
4 
               
w 10.1
5 
0.77 9.39 10.9
2 
 21.4
1 
7.6
4 
11.3
8 
29.8
0 
 16.9
1 
8.11 9.39 29.8
0 
              
?̅? 31.4
2 
9.67 18.0
6 
57.2
6 
 34.9
5 
10.
68 
23.2
9 
65.9
5 
 33.5
3 
10.4
0 
18.0
6 
65.9
5 
              
North Dakota (31 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
q 0.29 0.26 0.08 1.85  0.69 0.71 0.12 4.98  0.53 0.60 0.08 4.98 
              
n 408.
71 
188.
36 
54.0
0 
868.
00 
 226.
20 
138.
98 
15.0
0 
615.
00 
 298.
41 
182.
93 
15.0
0 
868.
00 
              
P 107.
61 
8.64 100.
00 
129.
37 
 208.
13 
68.8
1 
109.
34 
306.
86 
 167.
93 
72.7
9 
100.
00 
306.
86 
              
z 67.1
6 
11.0
8 
35.1
7 
87.7
0 
 89.8
6 
6.57 71.7
8 
99.9
6 
 80.7
8 
14.1
0 
35.1
7 
99.9
6 
               
61 
 
w 9.49 0.20 9.29 9.68  21.7
3 
7.97 11.3
4 
30.5
7 
 16.8
7 
8.63 9.29 30.5
7 
              
?̅? 32.1
0 
6.97 22.2
1 
50.0
3 
 41.0
5 
11.6
1 
27.1
2 
78.4
6 
 37.4
6 
10.6
3 
22.2
1 
50.0
3 
              
 
 
Oklahoma (41 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
q 0.56 0.67 0.12 3.70  1.56 1.85 0.27 11.7
6 
 1.16 1.57 0.12 11.7
7 
              
n 337.
60 
199.
27 
27.0
0 
777.
00 
 134.
72 
105.
57 
7.00 463.
00 
 215.
87 
179.
88 
7.00 777.
00 
              
P 103.
09 
4.97 100.
00 
118.
75 
 132.
24 
8.54 122.
26 
150.
77 
 120.
58 
16.0
7 
100.
00 
150.
77 
              
z 24.2
0 
17.7
4 
0.88 77.0
1 
 57.0
0 
21.3
2 
9.61 92.0
0 
 44.0
0 
25.4
5 
0.88 92.0
0 
               
w 8.69 0.31 8.37 8.99  20.0
0 
7.52 9.99 28.0
1 
 15.4
7 
8.05 8.37 28.0
1 
              
?̅? 30.7
1 
5.55 20.1
7 
53.7
7 
 33.8
8 
8.07 22.9
6 
70.4
0 
 32.6
1 
7.31 20.1
7 
70.4
0 
              
Washington (11 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Mi
n. 
Max
. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Mi
n. 
Max
. 
q 4.11 15.5
9 
0.1
1 
73.6
8 
 1.21 1.77 0.16 7.43  2.37 9.92 0.1
1 
73.6
8 
              
n 354.
27 
253.
89 
2.0
0 
924.
00 
 207.
00 
152.
30 
22.0
0 
680.
00 
 265.
91 
210.
04 
2.0
0 
924.
00 
              
P 95.6
1 
4.59 89.
70 
100.
00 
 173.
59 
51.4
0 
100.
50 
223.
06 
 142.
40 
55.3
2 
89.
69 
223.
06 
62 
 
              
z 39.0
9 
16.6
2 
3.5
4 
76.7
7 
 66.7
1 
17.3
0 
16.8
0 
95.6
1 
 55.6
6 
21.7
3 
3.5
4 
95.6
1 
               
w 9.97 0.51 9.4
7 
10.4
6 
 22.2
0 
8.56 11.0
8 
31.4
7 
 17.3
1 
8.95 9.4
7 
31.4
7 
              
?̅? 37.0
2 
6.41 24.
06 
46.7
7 
 39.9
7 
5.42 26.1
8 
48.5
2 
 38.7
9 
5.96 24.
06 
48.5
1 
              
 
 
Illinois (94 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 
2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max.  Mea
n 
S.d Mi
n. 
Max.  Mea
n 
S.d Mi
n. 
Max. 
q 0.24 0.23 0.07 2.18  0.33 040 0.0
7 
5.20  0.29 0.34 0.0
7 
5.20 
              
n 587.
31 
297.
11 
55.0
0 
1482
.00 
 416.
33 
223.
62 
17.
00 
1169
.00 
 484.
72 
268.
68 
17.
00 
1482
.00 
              
P 108.
66 
8.79 100.
00 
121.
02 
 195.
68 
77.2
6 
99.
45 
312.
88 
 160.
88 
73.6
8 
99.
45 
312.
88 
              
z 26.0
5 
15.0
9 
2.34 71.2
7 
 64.4
2 
15.4
6 
22.
47 
97.7
1 
 49.0
7 
24.2
5 
2.3
4 
97.7
1 
               
w 9.37 0.58 8.79 9.95  20.9
2 
7.53 11.
03 
29.3  16.3
0 
8.14 8.7
9 
29.3
0 
              
?̅? 78.1
0 
14.9
3 
45.8
2 
110.
65 
 99.8
8 
22.6
3 
47.
94 
155.
90 
 91.1
7 
22.5
8 
45.
82 
156.
90 
              
Indiana (79 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max.  Mea
n 
S.d Mi
n. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Mi
n. 
Max. 
q 0.24 0.23 0.07 2.18  0.33 040 0.0
7 
  0.29 0.34 0.0
7 
5.20 
              
63 
 
n 587.
31 
297.
11 
55.0
0 
1482
.00 
 416.
33 
223.
62 
17.
00 
  484.
72 
268.
68 
17.
00 
1482
.00 
              
P 108.
66 
8.79 100.
00 
121.
02 
 195.
68 
77.2
6 
99.
45 
  160.
88 
73.6
8 
99.
45 
312.
88 
              
z 26.0
5 
15.0
9 
2.34 71.2
7 
 64.4
2 
15.4
6 
22.
47 
  49.0
7 
24.2
5 
2.3
4 
97.7
1 
               
w 9.37 0.58 8.79 9.95  20.9
2 
7.53 11.
03 
  16.3
0 
8.14 8.7
9 
29.3
0 
              
?̅? 78.1
0 
14.9
3 
45.8
2 
110.
65 
 99.8
8 
22.6
3 
47.
94 
  91.1
7 
22.5
8 
45.
82 
156.
90 
              
 
 
Iowa (98 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Me
an 
S.d Min
. 
Max.  Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Max. 
q 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.35  0.31 0.16 0.11 1.01  0.25 0.14 0.07 1.01 
              
n 680.
04 
208.
83 
293.
00 
1445
.00 
 436.
78 
147.
07 
120.
00 
900.
00 
 534.
08 
211.
14 
120.
00 
1445
.00 
              
P 108.
06 
8.10 100.
00 
119.
29 
 206.
53 
83.1
1 
105.
50 
331.
61 
 167.
14 
80.6
0 
100.
00 
331.
61 
              
z 51.8
4 
16.0
8 
6.80 83.1
2 
 82.9
7 
10.7
2 
41.5
5 
99.0
9 
 70.5
2 
20.1
2 
6.80 99.1
0 
               
w 9.11 0.39 8.72 9.49  20.5
5 
7.60 10.4
9 
28.8
0 
 15.9
7 
8.13 8.72 28.8
0 
              
?̅? 84.6
5 
10.1
4 
59.1
7 
120.
96 
 108.
14 
17.0
2 
67.9
6 
151.
00 
 98.7
5 
18.6
3 
59.1
7 
151.
00 
              
 
Minnesota (74 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
64 
 
 Me
an 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
 Me
an 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
 Me
an 
S.d Min
. 
Max
. 
q 0.3
1 
2.5
1 
0.0
7 
4.65  0.6
2 
0.64 0.1
3 
5.20  0.5
0 
0.5
9 
0.0
7 
5.20 
              
n 588
.90 
287
.92 
47.
00 
1548
.00 
 380
.56 
187.
.58 
30.
00 
1198
.00 
 463
.89 
254
.05 
30.
00 
1548
.00 
              
P 105
.81 
5.9
7 
100
.00 
114.
37 
 205
.17 
81.4
1 
103
.13 
327.
41 
 165
.42 
79.
75 
100
.00 
327.
41 
              
z 44.
23 
23.
48 
2.9
1 
92.2
1 
 79.
60 
18.8
6 
10.
90 
99.5
0 
 65.
50 
27.
07 
2.9
1 
99.5
0 
               
w 9.7
8 
0.6
7 
9.1
1 
10.4
5 
 21.
05 
7.51 11.
24 
29.4
2 
 16.
45 
8.0
3 
9.1
1 
29.4
2 
              
?̅? 71.
43 
17.
90 
32.
98 
117.
14 
 92.
93 
25.5
5 
29.
83 
144.
91 
 84.
33 
25.
10 
29.
83 
144.
91 
              
 
 
Nebraska (81 counties) 
 Pre-ARPA 
1992, 1997 
  Post-ARPA 
2002, 2007, 2012 
   All Years 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
 Mea
n 
S.d Min
. 
Ma
x. 
q 0.76 1.56 0.11 12.5  1.17 2.57 0.12 19.0
4 
 1.00 2.23 0.11 19.0
4 
              
n 315.
82 
167.
67 
8.00 842.
00 
 253.
54 
139.
02 
6.00 700.
00 
 278.
45 
153.
99 
6.00 842.
00 
              
P 105.
75 
6.04 100.
00 
114.
61 
 200.
91 
79.1
0 
105.
54 
323.
79 
 162.
85 
77.0
8 
100.
00 
323.
79 
              
z 50.5
7 
18.7
5 
   
8.47 
89.7
0 
 85.4
9 
8.11 49.8
1 
98.5
1 
 71.5
2 
21.7
5 
8.47 98.5
1 
               
w 9.36 0.27 9.09 9.62  21.1
4 
7.76 10.8
6 
29.5
9 
 16.4
2 
8.34 9.09 29.5
9 
    
 
          
65 
 
?̅? 88.0
4 
25.6
7 
30.9
5 
143.
45 
 101.
95 
26.6
2 
35.7
0 
162.
75 
 96.3
9 
27.0
8 
30.9
5 
162.
75 
              
 
